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SPIRIT AIRLINES, INC. V. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.: 
A CASE FOR INCREASED REGULATION OF THE 
AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
ERICA WESSLING* 
ABSTRACT 
The relatively short history of the airline industry is characterized by 
sudden shifts and divergent standards that attempt to negotiate a complex 
market. High demand, uniqueness of service, and difficulty of market entry 
render the market particularly susceptible to monopolization among com-
petitors. Recently, the rise of the low-cost carrier business model has 
exposed high barriers to entry into the airline market. In attempts to remedy 
the harm against both prospective market entrants and consumers, low-
cost carriers have levied price predation claims against entrenched legacy 
airlines. Due to the difficulty in negotiating the divide between predatory 
behavior and lawful competition, courts have been justifiably reticent to 
penalize carriers for competitive pricing of passenger fare. However, despite 
the likely legality of the pricing structure of incumbent airlines, other ex-
clusionary practices, such as gate monopolization, fortify high barriers to 
entry and highlight the need for a shift in judicial and regulatory standards. 
Through analysis of the decision in Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Air-
lines, Inc., this Note analyzes antitrust issues within the helpful framework 
of contestability theory and considers judicial and regulatory changes to 
benefit new entrant airlines and consumers. 
                                                                                                                         
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, William & Mary Law School; B.A. in German Studies, summa 
cum laude, 2011, University of Florida, Phi Beta Kappa. Special thanks to Business Law 
Review Notes Editor Rachel Kelly for her stellar guidance and support. Many thanks also 
to the William & Mary Business Law Review staff and editorial board for their invaluable 
insight and assistance in preparing this Note for publication.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Due to the unique nature of the airline industry, reassessment of judicial 
standards and increased regulation is crucial in order to promote healthy com-
petition among air carriers and to protect consumers. Recently, the rise of the 
low-cost carrier business model in the 1990s has added an additional layer 
to this dynamic industry.1 Difficulties faced by low-cost carriers entering the 
market affirm the applicability of contestability as a theoretical guide, even if 
it is unattainable in reality.2 Barriers to entry include monopolistic gate 
leasing agreements and the hub dominance of high-cost legacy carriers.3 
These obstacles highlight the need for a shift in antitrust and regulatory policy 
in order to facilitate competition. 
The success of low-cost carriers has provoked a retaliatory response by 
incumbent legacy carriers, which “appear[] to be on a homicidal mission to 
destroy the low-fare airlines.”4 As a result, a slew of price predation claims 
have been made by low-cost carriers against entrenched legacy carriers.5 
These cases contest and attempt to delineate the fine line that divides illegal 
predatory practices from fair competition. In particular, the decision of the 
court in Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.6 demonstrates the need 
for a shift in the analysis of price predation claims under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.7 
This Note proposes that high barriers of entry to the airline market, 
while providing the opportunity for price predation, should not be considered 
by courts as dispositive of price predation. Instead, high barriers to entry 
                                                                                                                         
1 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Predation, Competition & Antitrust Law: Turbulence in the Air-
line Industry, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 685, 704 (2002) [hereinafter Dempsey, Turbulence in the 
Airline Industry]; see also Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: 
Theory, Firm Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 478 (1987) [hereinafter 
Levine, Airline Competition]. 
2 Dempsey, Turbulence in the Airline Industry, supra note 1, at 704; see also Levine, 
Airline Competition, supra note 1, at 397. 
3 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 692; Severin Borenstein, On the Persistent Financial Losses 
of U.S. Airlines: A Preliminary Exploration; Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
no. 16744 at 10–11 (Jan. 2011), available at http://perma.cc/UP6Y-9P59. 
4 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 688. The success of the low-cost carrier business model 
has prompted legacy carriers to defend their market dominance out of fear that increased 
competition will undermine their ability to maintain the high passenger fares that 
subsidize the “bells and whistles” of their expensive business model. Spirit Airlines, Inc. 
v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 922 (6th Cir. 2005). Whereas the profitability of low-cost 
carriers depends solely upon low fares, hub-and-spoke model legacy carriers seek to secure 
consumer loyalty by means of special programs, such as frequent flyer miles. Id. 
5 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 690. 
6 Spirit, 431 F.3d at 917. 
7 15 U.S.C. §2 (2004). 
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indicate the need for stricter regulations promulgated with the purpose of 
facilitating or providing equal grounds for market entry. Such changes would 
promote fair and healthy competition in the airline industry, thereby generat-
ing consumer benefit. 
Part I of this Note will discuss the historical background and commercial 
framework of the airline industry, the theory of perfect market contestabil-
ity, and the rise of the low-cost carrier business model. Part II will then 
discuss the Spirit decision. The conclusion will critique the Spirit court’s 
price predation analysis, focusing on the court’s inappropriate focus on 
predatory intent, mischaracterization of the relevant market for price pre-
dation purposes, and failure to utilize the theoretical guidelines provided 
by market contestability. Further, this Note contends that, although high 
barriers to entry may enhance opportunities for price predation, they are 
not dispositive of anti-competitive behavior in violation of antitrust laws. 
Instead, such barriers to entry confirm that the airline industry is not per-
fectly contestable and demonstrate the need for increased regulation. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. History and Effects of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 
In 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was established to oversee 
the “economic regulation of the burgeoning airline industry” and to moni-
tor “substantial competitive impulses” among airlines.8 The CAB was granted 
authority to regulate interstate air travel and retained sole authority over mat-
ters such as issuing operating permits and approving and assigning routes.9 
The purpose for establishing the CAB was to hinder “destructive and canni-
balistic” competitive practices among airlines in an industry that naturally 
tends to form monopolies.10 The CAB sought to ensure fair practice re-
garding market entry and to restrict anti-competitive tactics.11 Under a gener-
ous grant of authority, the CAB regulated most air carrier business activity, 
including “entry and exit from individual city-pair markets, air fares, methods 
of competition, mergers and acquisitions, and inter-carrier agreements.”12 
In 1978, Jimmy Carter approved the Deregulation Act (“Act”) with the 
purpose of limiting the scope of federal aviation regulations in order to 
                                                                                                                         
8 Timothy M. Ravich, Re-Regulation and Airline Passengers’ Rights, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 
935, 959, 960 (2002). When the CAB was created, airlines primarily transported mail, not 
passengers. Id. 
9 Id. at 960. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Stephen E. Creager, Airline Deregulation and Airport Regulation, 93 YALE L.J. 
319, 319–20 (1983). 
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encourage a “market-driven commercial aviation system.”13 The Act served 
to lessen the control of the CAB and the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) over the commercial aviation industry.14 Although the FAA retained 
some control to regulate airway safety matters, most authority to influence 
the “day-to-day” operation of airports was greatly restricted by the Act.15 
Prior to the Act, the CAB was the final regulatory authority charged to 
approve all airline route decisions.16 Proponents of deregulation contend 
that the CAB’s exercise of its broad powers unnecessarily impeded market 
entry and prevented the airline market from approaching an optimal com-
petitive state.17 For instance, the CAB granted none of the seventy-nine appli-
cations it received from new entrants seeking access to a route between 1950 
and 1974.18 Meanwhile, incumbent domestic airlines secured their “advan-
tageous positions” by means of the benevolent oversight of the CAB prior 
to 1978.19 Despite the salutary effects of deregulation, entrenched incum-
bent airlines have retained a large degree of control and can prevent new 
airlines from entering the market.20 One concern is that incumbents may 
utilize this power to thwart new entrants while remaining “immune” from 
antitrust allegations.21 
One of the effects of deregulation was to transfer much of the “adminis-
trative regulatory burden” of air transportation from airlines to airports.22 
Further, current regulation of airport user fees prevents airports from dealing 
with this “burden.”23 Ensuring fair and efficient access to airport gates, routes, 
and terminals has been one of the greatest post-deregulation problems.24 
With the diminishment of CAB authority following deregulation, slots are 
allocated among commercial carriers by means of a scheduling committee, 
                                                                                                                         
13 Ravich, supra note 8, at 961. 
14 Creager, supra note 12, at 320. 
15 Ravich, supra note 8, at 961; Creager, supra note 12, at 320. 
16 Creager, supra note 12, at 332. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 328 n.56. 
19 Id. at 339. 
20 Id. at 333. 
21 Id. at 339. Despite its goal of facilitating optimal competition, the Act did not address 
the potential harm of dominant incumbent airlines. Critics of deregulation argue that, far 
from balancing out a market dominated by incumbents, deregulation “shifted the effective 
power of approval of new air routes from the CAB ... to incumbent airlines.” Id. at 332. 
22 Id. at 319. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. Proposed solutions to the issue of fair opportunity for new entrants by means of 
regulatory policy include “allocating access to airports by auction, subjecting the airport 
terminal subleasing policies of airlines to a heightened antitrust scrutiny, foreclosing the 
ability of certain airlines to veto plans to expand airport terminal capacity, and requiring new 
entrant airlines to bear the full cost of their entry.” Id. 
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which permits the airlines the opportunity to bargain.25 Should this process 
fail, the FAA has retained some authority to intervene.26 
The 1978 Airline Deregulation Act (“Act”) was promulgated under the 
theory that regulation interfered with the “naturally competitive” airline in-
dustry.27 Analysts contended that the airline market would achieve “perfect 
competition” in the absence of regulation.28 The Act entrusted airline com-
petitors with greater business discretion under the belief that competition 
would lead to “optimal price and output conditions” due to the “perfectly 
contestable” nature of the airline industry.29 The Act was further intended to 
facilitate market entry for new competitors, which was necessary to achieve 
any semblance of perfect competition.30 
Deregulation in 1978 was followed by the entry of new airlines into the 
market.31 The mid-1990s was marked by a “second wave” of new entrants 
into the airline market.32 Between 1990 and 1995, as many as five new air-
lines entered the market each year.33 A “record” forty-two airlines submitted 
applications for the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity in 1993, 
which is a prerequisite for competing as a commercial airline carrier.34 De-
spite an auspicious start, the second half of the decade “was an era of 
bankruptcies, liquidations and retrenchments for upstart airlines.”35 During 
                                                                                                                         
25 Id. at 327. 
26 Id. at 327 n.53. Other slot allocation options under the FAA include a lottery system, an 
auction, the “grandfathering of slots based on historical pattern,” and administrative 
review. Id. The need for some regulatory authority to provide fair opportunity for market 
entry for new airlines is evidenced by the airport’s difficulty to manage slot allocation. Id. 
For instance, when the slot committee denied New York Air’s slot request at Washington 
National Airport in the fall of 1980, the FAA intervened to approve the slot request. Id. In 
this instance, the FAA served to remedy the pre-deregulation tendency of the CAB to 
thwart most new entrants. See id. at 319. 
27 Levine, Airline Competition, supra note 1, at 398. 
28 Id. at 400. In the 1970s, advocates of deregulation “suggested that performance without 
deregulatory intervention would approximate perfect competition.” Id. “Even when analysts 
recognized that small numbers of competitors were characteristic of airline markets, a feature 
which conventionally suggested imperfect competition, they tended to predict competitive 
performance.” Id. 
29 Levine, Airline Competition, supra note 1, at 403. 
30 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 702. Though the notions of perfect competition and 
perfect contestability are “both unattainable ideal states,” some economic theorists espouse 
that perfect contestability serves as a more useful framework to guide analysis of the airline 
industry. Elizabeth E. Bailey, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets, 1 
YALE J. ON REG. 111, 112 (1984) [hereinafter Bailey, Deregulation]. 
31 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 703. These new entrants to the airline market included 
Midway Airlines, America West, and People Express. Id. 
32 Id. at 704. 
33 Id. at 688. 
34 Id. at 705. 
35 Id. at 688. 
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the dry spell of 1995 to the first months of 1999, “not a single new airline 
began service.”36 
Empirical data suggest that deregulation minimally benefited enterprises 
seeking to compete with incumbent airlines.37 Statistics regarding the profit-
ability of the U.S. passenger airline market over the last several decades 
are bleak.38 Domestic passenger airlines lost $59 billion between 1979 and 
2009.39 Further, the airline industry operated at a profit during only eight of 
the first thirty-one years following deregulation.40 
Airline carriers have been spiraling downward in a trend of unprofitability 
since deregulation.41 The 2000s have been described as “financially disas-
trous” for U.S. domestic airlines42 and analysts have noted the “volatility of 
airline profits.”43 Data further suggest that airline carriers have been gain-
ing momentum in their unprofitable plunge.44 For instance, of the roughly 
$60 billion in losses incurred by the domestic airline carrier market over the 
last thirty years, the majority occurred in the last decade.45 From 2008 to 
2009, aggregate net losses for domestic passenger airlines were $14 billion 
from a total revenue of $270 billion.46 
Other forces apart from deregulation have contributed to the decreased 
profitability of the domestic airline industry. Certain contributing variables 
include “demand and cost shocks.”47 Cost factors contributing to decreased 
profitability include high taxes and increased fuel costs.48 Tax and fuel are 
considered exogenous factors, with fuel costs being “approximately the same 
for all airlines.”49 Fuel price increases in 2008 undermined airline profitability 
by necessitating a reduction in flight schedules.50 Additional costs include 
                                                                                                                         
36 Id. 
37 Borenstein, supra note 3, at 2. Cf. Levine, Airline Competition, supra note 1, at 
397. (“Evidence of impediments to contestability in air transport markets does not affect 
the policy conclusion that airline deregulation has been a very considerable improvement 
over the previous regulated regime.”). 
38 Borenstein, supra note 3, at 2. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 3. 
41 Id. at 2. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 3. 
44 Id. at 2. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 2. 
47 Id. at 12. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 4, 10–11. 
50 Id. at 6. 
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airport-imposed passenger facility charges upon airlines which may consist 
of up to $4.50 per passenger at commercial airports run by public agencies.51 
Weak demand is one of the more decisive factors adversely affecting air-
line profitability.52 Decreased demand flows in part from heightened safety 
concerns and increased inconvenience of travel resulting from the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks.53 From 2000 to 2002, demand decreased at the 
“unprecedented” rate of 20 percent.54 More expensive passenger fares may 
have weakened demand for air travel as well. In the late 1990s, decreased 
city-pair competition was accompanied by increased average airfare.55 Fur-
thermore, intense competition from new entrant low-cost carriers played a 
great role in undercutting demand for incumbent legacy carriers.56 
B. Commercial Framework of the Airline Industry 
An airport slot is the “right to operate a service at a particular time.”57 The 
FAA originally distributed airport slots.58 The international standard for 
“airport slot management” is set forth in the Worldwide Slot Guidelines of 
the International Air Transport Association (IATA).59 Slot allocation permits 
airlines to “acquire, retain and exchange” the slots needed to operate.60 The 
IATA intends for the slot distribution process to facilitate the efficient use 
of airport space for which there is high demand in order to maximize ben-
efit to the greatest extent possible for passengers.61 The crucial need for 
airport slots as a prerequisite to competitive viability for airline carriers is 
evidenced by the use of airport slots as bartering chips. For instance, in 
August 2010, Continental agreed to lease eighteen pairs of take-off and 
                                                                                                                         
51 Id. at 4. These fees are used “to fund FAA approved projects that enhance safety, 
security, or capacity; reduce noise; or increase air carrier competition.” Passenger Facility 
Charge (PFC) Program, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (last modified Feb. 11, 2015, 
4:53 PM), http://www.faa.gov/airports/pfc/, archived at https://perma.cc/GNV2-VEF6 
?type=source. 
52 Borenstein, supra note 3, at 3. 
53 Id. at 7. 
54 Id. 
55 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 688. 
56 Borenstein, supra note 3. The threat posed to legacy carriers by low-cost carriers will be 
discussed in greater detail later in this section. 
57 Charlie Leocha, Who Owns Airport Slots? The American People or the Airlines?, 
CONSUMER TRAVELER (Aug. 30, 2010), http://consumertraveler.com/today/who-owns-airport 
slots-the-american-people-or-the-airlines/, archived at http://perma.cc/CLA8-37NF. 
58 Id. 
59  Worldwide Airport Slots, IATA, http://www.iata.org/policy/slots/Pages/slot-guide 
lines.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3T88-FA2G. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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landing slots at Newark to Southwest Airlines in order to obtain approval 
for a proposed merger.62 
Airports are categorized according to the service they provide, such as 
commercial, cargo, and general aviation airports.63 Commercial service air-
ports provide service to a minimum of 2,500 passengers each year, with 
primary airports each accommodating at least 10,000 passengers each year.64 
Primary airports are further classified by hub type, which includes large, 
medium, small, or non-hub and is determined by number of passengers per 
year.65 Large hubs service at least 1 percent of annual passenger boardings.66 
Medium and small hubs serve less than 1 percent of annual airline passen-
gers, with non-hubs accommodating between 2,500 and 10,000 passenger 
boardings per year.67 
The ‘hub and spoke system’ has emerged as the “route structure of choice 
for deregulated airlines.”68 The word ‘hub’ itself was “virtually absent from 
pre-deregulation theoretical comment on the industry.”69 Following dereg-
ulation, most of the legacy airlines, except for Southwest Airlines, have 
adopted the hub-and-spoke model.70 Hub dominance must be monitored with 
care, due to its correlation with monopolization and “escalating fares” for 
airline passengers.71 
In the 1990s, a correlation was noted between increased hub concentra-
tion and a decline in competitive service.72 Department of Transportation 
(DOT) research also confirmed that the most concentrated hubs produced 
the highest air fares.73 After comparing prices at fifteen concentrated hub 
airports and thirty-eight unconcentrated hub airports, the General Accounting 
Office concluded that passenger fare is often as much as 27 percent greater at 
concentrated hubs.74 Passengers departing from airport hubs may pay “50 
percent more than they would had deregulation not occurred.”75 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                         
62 Leocha, supra note 57. 
63 Airport Categories, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (last modified Oct. 21, 2014, 4:36 PM), 
http://www.faa.gov/airports/planning_capacity/passenger_allcargo_stats/categories/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/9PLZ-6VVJ. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Levine, Airline Competition, supra note 1, at 411. 
69 Id. at 413. 
70 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 692. 
71 Id. at 695. 
72 Id. at 688. 
73 Id. at 696. 
74 Id. 
75 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 695. 
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when one airline carrier controls more than half of the hub market, pas-
sengers often end up paying “significantly more than the industry norm.”76 
Classic hubs are large airports that service major cities or highly popu-
lated areas.77 Such hubs typically cater to passengers on long distance flights 
and utilize shorter “spoke” flights as needed to connect passengers to their 
final destination.78 However, decreased efficiency due to waiting on connect-
ing baggage and passengers is the cost of providing a greater variety of desti-
nation options by means of “spoke” flights.79 
Hub dominance has stifled competition by permitting hub-dominant air-
lines to monopolize routes.80 Hub dominance “enables the dominant airline to 
increase the number of city-pair monopolies radiating from the hub, allow-
ing monopoly fares to be imposed on origin-and-destination passengers.”81 
Airlines adamantly prefer this route structure, despite the heightened costs 
of “hubbing,” which result from “lowering aircraft, gate, and labor utilization 
and increasing fuel consumption.”82 
Countervailing benefits of the hub-centric strategy include “scheduling 
flexibility and insulation from new competition.”83 Once they have estab-
lished a hub, airlines may then add on spokes to gain “incremental connecting 
passengers,” thereby maximizing revenue potential.84 After establishing hub-
dominance, an airline may easily “increase the number of city-pair monopo-
lies radiating from the hub,” and thereby maintain inflated passenger fare.85 
The opportunity to lease gates plays a critical role in an airline’s ability to 
generate profit.86 Greater control of a hub’s gates enables airlines to secure 
“scheduling flexibility and insulation from new competition.”87 Restricting 
access to gates therefore poses one of the most significant barriers to entry 
for an airline competitor and implicates market contestability.88 
                                                                                                                         
76 Id. 
77 Ryan Griffin, State Aid, the Growth of Low-Cost Carriers in the European Union, and 
the Impact of the 2005 Guidelines on Financing of Airports and Start-Up Aid to Airlines De-
parting from Regional Airports, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 341, 345 (2006). 
78 Id. at 344. 
79 Id. at 346. 
80 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 692. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 927 (6th Cir. 2005). 
87 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 692. 
88 Spirit, 431 F.3d at 927. The notion of perfect market contestability will be discussed 
later in this section. 
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Although determination of route schedules and pricing has been almost 
entirely unregulated since the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act,89 runway ac-
cess remains largely regulated by local government.90 Airlines usually ensure 
gate access through “long-term exclusive-use leases with the local airport 
authority.”91 Further, there is no “formal market mechanism” in the distribu-
tion of gates by local airport commissions.92 The current regulatory scheme 
does not preclude large airline carriers from forming “relationships with 
airports that allow [them] to restrict the availability of gates, landing slots 
and other resources to potential entrants.”93 As a result, access to gates by 
new market entrants is “not determined by open competition.”94 
Hub dominance through gate monopolization by large airline carriers has 
raised concerns regarding alleged unlawful suppression of competition.95 
In addition to airline competition, such practices also implicate consumer 
welfare, as airline carriers holding a greater number of gate leases are able 
to exact higher passenger fares.96 Other competitive practices by large airline 
carriers trigger suspicion of unlawful competitive behavior.97 These prac-
tices include “frequent-flyer and corporate discount programs that exchange 
discounts for customer loyalty.” 98  Further practices that enable legacy 
carriers to derive benefit to the exclusion of low-cost carriers include “exclu-
sive alliances with regional feeder carriers, their ability to bias the computer 
reservations systems they own against competing interline connections, [and] 
their ability to bribe travel agents with commission overrides to steer busi-
ness their way.”99 
In the airline industry, market concentration is analyzed based on overlap-
ping city-pair routes.100 The Transportation Research Board of the National 
                                                                                                                         
89 Pub. L. No. 95–504, § 2493, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978). 
90 Spirit, 431 F.3d at 928 (quoting Gautam Gowrisankaran, Competition and Regulation 
in the Airline Industry, FED. RESERVE BD. OF S.F. ECON. LETTER, Number 2002-01, p. 1). 
91 Spirit, 431 F.3d at 928. “In 1996, the GAO found that 76 of the 86 gates at the Detroit 
airport were covered by long term leases until 2008 and Northwest had 64 of such 
leases.” Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Borenstein, supra note 3, at 9; Borenstein, supra note 3, at 9–10. 
94 Spirit, 431 F.3d at 927. 
95 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 692. 
96 Id. 
97 Borenstein, supra note 3, 9–10. 
98 Id. at 9. 
99 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 702. 
100 Craig Peters, Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from the 
U.S. Airline Industry, 49 J.L. & ECON. 627, 631 (2006); see also Bailey, Deregulation, 
supra note 30, at 113. The unattainable ideals of perfect competition and perfect contestability 
are distinguishable. Id. However, both theoretical market states claim “totally unimpeded” 
“entry into and exit from the industry” as a factor. Id. Perfectly competitive industries 
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Research Council espouses that airline competition is properly analyzed in 
terms of city pairs.101 Competition for airline passengers is thus framed in 
consideration of “thousands of combinations of origin and destination (O-
D) points.”102 
C. The Theory of Perfect Market Contestability 
Under the contestability theory, “perfectly contestable” markets enable 
new entrants to provide a competitive check on the pricing of incumbent busi-
nesses.103 While the degree to which a market is contestable hinges on many 
variables, freedom of entry and exit for new market entrants is generally con-
sidered the single most influential factor.104 Contestability of markets hinges 
on low barriers to entry, so that new entrants may offer competitive prices.105 
Similarly, ease of exit serves the essential purpose of promoting investment 
by preserving the ability to abandon an unprofitable investment.106 
Proponents of the contestability theory within the context of the airline 
industry maintain that low barriers to entry enable new market entrants to 
become viable competitors, thereby restricting the ability of entrenched air-
lines to extract excessive profits.107 The view that competition provides a 
natural check on unfair pricing relies on low barriers to entry, such that “if 
fares rose, other airlines could easily enter the market.”108 Competitive pric-
ing provided by new entrants would then provide consumers with lower-cost 
options and force incumbents to lower fares in order to remain viable in 
the market.109 
It is useful to consider three features when calibrating the degree to which 
a market approaches the ideal of perfect contestability.110 The first feature is 
                                                                                                                         
also must consist of “a large number of miniscule firms.” Id. at 118. This supports the argu-
ment for increased regulation in Part II, ensuring that at least some low-cost carrier new 
entrants can remain viable promotes healthy competition by creating a market resembling 
the theoretical model of perfect competition. See id. at 115. The ideal of perfect competition 
has been criticized for “its lack of realism and its inflexibility.” Id. 
101 Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 933 (6th Cir. 2005). 
102 Id. 
103 Bailey, Deregulation, supra note 30, at 112. 
104 Id. at 113. 
105 Id. at 111. 
106 Id. at 120. 
107 Peter C. Carstensen, Evaluating “Deregulation of Commercial Air Travel: False 
Dichotomization, Untenable Theories, and Unimplemented Premises, 46 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 109, 115 (1989). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Bailey, Deregulation, supra note 30, at 120, 121. Because the notion of perfect 
contestability, like perfect competition, “is highly improbable in reality,” analysts deem 
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freedom of exit, which enables the new entrant to walk away from an un-
profitable investment.111 Second, markets are considered contestable when 
potential entrants can readily respond to opportunities to enter the market, 
thereby serving as a “threat” to incumbent businesses and ensuring competi-
tive pricing.112 The third factor indicating market contestability is the “slug-
gishness” in the competitive pricing responses of incumbent enterprises.113 
Strict adherence to the idea of perfectly contestable markets suggests that 
such markets do not require regulatory interference.114 Despite the accepted 
notion that unrestricted entry and exit is crucial for promoting market con-
testability, public interest necessitates imposing regulatory restrictions in 
certain circumstances.115 For instance, regulatory policies impeding exit have 
been motivated by such concerns as maintaining access to service for remote 
consumers and preserving jobs.116 
During the deregulation of the airline industry, the Civil Aeronautics 
Board propounded the contestability of aviation markets.117 Contestability 
theory advocates have cited the successful unregulated airline markets in 
California and Texas while contending that natural competition would pro-
duce lower fares and a more salubrious environment for new enterprises.118 
Simple consideration of the mobility of aircraft seemed to support the notion 
                                                                                                                         
markets contestable even when “the requirements of contestability are fulfilled only 
approximately.” Id. at 114. A second “formal definition” identifies contestable markets as 
those in which there are no sunk costs, which are “outlay[s] that cannot be recouped 
without substantial delay.” Id. at 113–14. 
111 Id. at 120. “[F]reedom of exit is merely the obverse of freedom of entry.” Id. Following 
an unsuccessful venture, a recent entrant may exit a perfectly contestable market without 
sunk costs, thereby decreasing risk and encouraging competitive investment. Id. at 114. 
112 Id. A “standby” new entrant’s ability to seize opportunities to offer competitively 
priced, yet profitable, fares depends on the carrier’s ability to “choose the timing, place, 
and manner of entry that best suits the circumstances.” Id. This Note contends that legacy 
carrier’s monopolization of gate leases serves as a major impediment to contestability in light 
of this second factor. Id. at 131. 
113 Id. at 121. While the third factor is not “essential,” a lag period protects the new 
entrant. Id. Though this may seem to inflate the price in the short term, helping new entrants 
stay afloat ultimately aids competition by preventing market domination by incumbents. 
Some even maintain “that regulation-induced lags in pricing may well be salutary.” Id. 
114 Id. at 111. 
115 Id. at 120. Such restrictions undermine contestability, because “[a]ny impediment 
to exit by definition increases the riskiness, and hence the real cost, of opening for a business.” 
116 Id. Countervailing public interest issues have arisen in both the railroad and airline 
industries. Id. Such protectionist regulatory policy comes at the cost of inhibiting compe-
tition. Id. at 120. As opposed to the indirect, cross subsidy approach, critics have suggested 
direct subsidization. Id. 
117 Id. at 127–28. 
118 Carstensen, supra note 107, at 115. 
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of inherent competitive checks on passenger fare through entry of new com-
petitors in a perfectly contestable market.119 
This simplistic view of market entry fails to take into account that physi-
cally transferring investment capital is the final phase in the laborious process 
of launching and establishing passenger service. More significant contesta-
bility considerations include the variety of obstacles that create high barriers 
to entry in the airline industry.120 For instance, new market entrants—and 
thus market contestability—are hampered by “network-reinforcing marketing 
practices like price discrimination, customer loyalty programs, travel agency 
incentive programs, and computer reservations system (CRS) search bias, as 
well as the use of historic airport facilities commitments.”121 
The variety of obstacles contributing to high barriers to entry in the airline 
industry indicate that the airline industry is far from achieving perfect con-
testability and that complete deregulation does not produce optimal com-
petition.122 In light of these entry obstacles for new airlines, proponents of 
perfect contestability must temper the notion that completely deregulated 
markets are “the best of all possible worlds” against the reality that some mar-
ket intervention may be necessary to protect both airline competitors as well 
as air passengers.123 
D. The Low-Cost Carrier Business Model 
Consistent with their name, low-cost air carriers utilize operational strate-
gies that minimize cost and promote efficiency, thereby enabling them to 
provide lower passenger fares.124 Herb Kelleher established the prototype for 
the low-cost carrier model when he started Southwest Airlines in 1971.125 
Other established low-cost carriers include Frontier, Vanguard, Reno, Kiwi, 
and Spirit.126 Following the deregulation of the United States airline industry, 
low-cost carriers have served to promote efficiency, increase destination op-
tions, and decrease passenger fare.127 
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The Department of Transportation concurs that low-cost carriers produce 
consumer savings while increasing route density.128 Further benefit includes 
the effect of low-cost carriers in providing a competitive check on passenger 
fare prices offered by incumbent legacy carriers.129 In dominated hub mar-
kets, low-cost carrier service may provide consumers with savings of up to 
seventy dollars per passenger, or 40 percent, for one-way fares.130 
Low-cost carriers in the United States have been noted as “the world’s 
most mature.”131 In addition to challenging the traditional business model 
of incumbent airlines, domestic low-cost carriers provide steep competition 
for one another as route density increases.132 For example, whereas low-cost 
carriers only overlapped on twenty-three routes in 2005, they competed for 
market share on 139 routes by the end of 2009.133 
The efficiency of the low-cost carrier business model has enabled new 
entrant airlines to provide lower passenger fares while maintaining competi-
tive pressure on entrenched legacy airlines.134 For instance, American Air-
lines, one of the largest domestic carriers, incurs costs on domestic flights that 
are 26.9 percent greater than Southwest and exceed JetBlue’s costs by 62.5 
percent.135 The two mainstays of the low-cost carrier strategy are “simple 
products and low operating costs.”136 Other crucial low-cost carrier tactics 
include “a single passenger class, a single type of airplane, a simple fare 
scheme, unreserved seating, flights to secondary airports, point-to-point rather 
than hub and spoke networks, emphasis on direct ticket sales, and elimination 
of in-flight meals and other in-flight services.”137 
Elimination of costs by low-cost carriers depends on uniformity and sim-
plicity of service.138 Low-cost carriers maximize efficiency by eliminating 
first- and business-class tickets as well as reserved seating.139 Offering only 
one class of ticket further serves to maximize the number of passengers per 
flight and to reduce turnaround time by enabling passengers to board the 
                                                                                                                         
128 Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 926 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing 
U.S. Department of Transportation, The Low Cost Airline Service Revolution, Apr. 1996 
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2010). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Griffin, supra note 77, at 344. 
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aircraft more quickly.140 Low-cost carriers also streamline cost through the 
elimination of complimentary services and features, such as airplane window 
blinds, reclining seats, seat pockets, and headrest covers.141 
The low-cost carrier strategy also incorporates use of secondary air-
ports.142 Flying into secondary airports minimizes an air carrier’s operating 
costs, because secondary airports often charge less stringent landing and 
service fees.143 Taking advantage of these lower fees is critical for stream-
lining operational expenses, because such airport fees are one of airlines’ 
major costs.144 Airlines obtain further benefit through use of secondary air-
ports by means of increased efficiency.145 The decreased congestion of sec-
ondary airports enables low-cost carriers to achieve faster turnaround times, 
thereby maximizing the daily number of flights provided by each airplane.146 
Low-cost carriers further minimize costs by utilizing only one model 
of aircraft and engine.147 A “uniform fleet” provides for decreased cost of 
training for pilots, flight attendants, and maintenance crews.148 Maintain-
ing one type of plane is less expensive, because airlines can stock up on spare 
parts without worrying that they will become useless.149 Further, operating 
with one style of aircraft contributes to operating efficiency, because switch-
ing between aircraft models would require training for pilots, mechanics, 
and crew.150 
Even though the survival of low-cost carriers precariously hinges upon 
the single variable of competitive pricing, whereas legacy carriers extract 
benefit through a variety of aggressive tactics, low-cost carriers have never-
theless threateningly encroached upon market share.151 The success of low-
cost carriers has placed “enormous pressure on the established carriers.”152 
Legacy carriers, whose business model relies on brand-name recognition, 
have realized that consumers are motivated more by lower prices than by 
loyalty to a particular brand.153 
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The success of the low-cost carrier business model comes from the 
ability to fuel demand by means of “lower but still profit-producing fares.”154 
Soon after entering the market in 1971, low-cost carriers established them-
selves as viable competitors and have been recognized as “the driving force 
in the industry” since the mid-1990s.155 By 2006, low-cost carriers had 
obtained roughly 35 percent of the United States domestic airline market.156 
By this time, Southwest Airlines had become the fourth-largest domestic air-
line, as based upon volume of passengers.157 Low-cost carriers have main-
tained a trend of prosperity since the 1990s.158 As a result, low-cost carriers 
were competing with legacy carriers on more than 60 percent of city-pairs 
by 2011.159 In addition, the relative success of legacy carriers as compared to 
low-cost carriers is compromised by the fact that legacy carrier operating 
costs have exceeded those of their low-cost counterparts by at least 40 percent 
since the early 2000s.160 Data indicates that low-cost carriers consistently 
incurred fewer losses than legacy carriers in the last decade.161 This dispar-
ity in efficiency and success is exacerbated by the particular demands of the 
aviation industry, in which a successful airline must “earn[] consistent profits 
through the typical cycles in the airline business environment.”162 
In addition to forcing legacy carriers to share the market, the prevalence 
of low-cost options has caused anxiety among traditionally dominant car-
riers by reducing their ability to sell more expensive fares.163 With the entry 
of each new low-cost carrier, the proportion of low to high cost passenger 
fares increases accordingly. 164  In some instances, the average fare has 
dropped from $173 to approximately $115.165 The prevalence of low-cost op-
tions has “dramatically” reduced demand for more costly passenger fares.166 
Low-cost carriers’ threatening encroachment upon the market share 
and profits of established airlines has incited various retaliatory responses 
among legacy carriers.167 Major air carriers have exercised defensive tac-
tics “when a small affordable air carrier enters the market they dominate.”168 
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This has been identified by some as a “campaign to eradicate competition” 
out of fear that these new low-cost entrants would force legacy carriers to 
lower passenger fares.169 
The panicked response of legacy carriers has been described by avia-
tion law scholar Paul Stephen Dempsey as a “homicidal mission to destroy 
the low-fare airlines.”170 The Justice Department reported as early as 1993 
that legacy carrier American Airlines estimated the invasion of low passenger 
fares threatened $3.6 billion in annual revenue.171 By the late 1990s, vari-
ous legacy carriers had established adversarial stances against particular low-
fare competitors, including United against Frontier and Western Pacific, 
American against Vanguard and Western Pacific, Delta against ValuJet, and 
Northwest against Spirit Airlines.172 
Defensive measures adopted by legacy carriers in order to maintain their 
stranglehold on the market include the expansion of legacy carrier networks 
by means of mergers and megacarrier alliances.173 Legacy carriers also pro-
vide nonstop fares corresponding to low-cost carrier connecting fares in an 
attempt to maintain their market share.174 A further strategy of “saturat[ing] 
the route” with low fares in order to undermine low-cost carrier ticket sales 
has spurred claims of price predation.175 These allegedly predatory tactics 
practiced by large incumbent airlines include adding both flights and seats to 
routes threatened by low-cost carriers in order to force them from the mar-
ket, reducing prices to “below-cost levels,” and tampering with computer 
reservations to ensure that competitor’s connections are less convenient.176 
Legacy airlines have even been accused of bribing travel agents with com-
missions in order to secure reservations.177 
Although the DOT was initially able to thwart price predation through 
“moral persuasion,” the DOT recognized the futility of this approach and 
set forth an official policy statement regarding anti-competitive and exclu-
sionary practices by 1998.178 The DOT established guidelines geared to-
wards preventing the practice of hub-dominant carriers of adding flights 
and seats while lowering passenger fares.179 According to the DOT, predation 
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includes “any response to new entry by a hub-dominant airline that makes 
economic sense only because the hub carrier can exclude the new entrant 
from the market and thereafter return to its pre-entry fares.”180 
Following thirty-two claims of alleged price predation against legacy 
carriers, the DOT issued a statement on Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in 
1998, and a corresponding policy in 2001.181 Seventeen of these claims were 
made by new entrants to the airline market, supporting the widely adopted 
conclusion that incumbent airlines were targeting their younger low-cost 
competitors.182 The Department of Justice (DOJ) first alleged antitrust vio-
lations based on price predation against one of the major legacy carriers, 
American Airlines, in May of 1990.183 Action by the DOJ was triggered by 
the acute suppression of competition as a result of the conduct of legacy car-
riers, such as American Airlines.184 
According to the Supreme Court, price predation occurs when a com-
petitor sets prices “below an appropriate measure of cost for the purpose 
of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing competition in the 
long run.”185 Varying theories exist concerning cost measurement for the 
purposes of identifying predatory pricing.186 While analysts have not set-
tled upon a “perfect touchstone,” courts generally look to “the relation of the 
suspect price to the firm’s costs.”187 Because courts are wary of inhibiting 
healthy, consumer-beneficial competition, courts tend to strictly construe 
predatory pricing standards.188 Generally, pricing is predatory when it is less 
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than the figure produced by dividing the airline’s average variable costs189 
for a flight by the number of seats for that flight.190 
Due to the dangerous overlap between predatory behavior and aggres-
sively competitive pricing, the Supreme Court established a high threshold 
for antitrust injury based upon predatory pricing through the Brooke Group 
test.191 Under the first prong of the test, a plaintiff must establish that the 
defendant unprofitably set prices below an appropriate measure of cost.192 
The second prong stipulates that the defendant must have had a “reasonable 
prospect of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.”193 This period 
of recoupment enables the business to recover for losses sustained during the 
seemingly irrational period of unprofitable predatory pricing.194 
In order to determine the ability of a business to successfully recoup 
losses incurred through a sub-competitive predatory pricing period, the Su-
preme Court looks to the nature of the market.195 The possibility of re-
coupment depends primarily upon market concentration, the feasibility for the 
defendant to acquire the plaintiff’s share of the market, and high barriers 
to entry.196 While the Court is reticent to find for plaintiffs in price preda-
tion cases, it has at least acknowledged that the nature of the airline industry 
“can at a minimum allow unfair exclusionary practices to succeed.”197 
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Plaintiffs may pursue predatory pricing claims under section 2 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act.198 Plaintiffs must establish (1) that defendant secured 
monopoly power in the relevant market; and that (2) this power was used for 
anti-competitive or exclusionary purposes, as opposed to “growth or de-
velopment resulting from a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.”199 Due to the difficulty in distinguishing between legitimate 
competition and predatory behavior, courts typically “resolve antitrust claims 
on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the ‘particular facts disclosed by the 
record.’”200 Such modes of antitrust enforcement are intended not to protect 
businesses from unfair competition, but to “protect the public from the failure 
of the market.”201 
II. ASSESSING AND MINIMIZING OPPORTUNITIES FOR PREDATORY 
PRICING IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
A. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.: The Spirit Court’s 
Analysis Is Flawed 
Plaintiff Spirit Airlines, Inc. (“Spirit”), sued defendant Northwest Air-
lines, Inc. (“Northwest”), under section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2.202 Spirit alleged that Northwest intended to monopolize the “lei-
sure passenger airline market[]” through the predatory pricing of passenger 
fares.203 Spirit specifically alleged that Northwest had the predatory purpose 
of ousting Spirit from the Detroit-Boston and Detroit-Philadelphia routes.204 
The District Court granted Northwest’s motion for summary judgment, 
accepting its argument that price-cost comparison should consider all 
passengers along the disputed routes and not just the low-fare ‘leisure’ 
bracket.205 A price-cost comparison taking into account other routes in addi-
tion to Northwest’s ‘leisure’ portion does not support predatory pricing, 
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because revenues for those routes would not be “irrationally” lower than cor-
responding costs, thus making the routes unprofitable.206 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that 
Northwest’s route monopolization created opportunity for recoupment, 
thereby preserving Spirit’s price predation claim.207 Further, the circuit 
court concluded “that a reasonable trier of fact could find that a separate 
and distinct low-fare or leisure-passenger market existed.”208 However, 
although the Spirit court supported the Ninth Circuit’s partial adoption of 
the Areeda/Turner test, it did not set forth its own version of average vari-
able cost.209 
At the time of the suit, Spirit was a low-fare carrier operating out of 
Detroit.210 Spirit’s argument hinged on its depiction of a relevant market 
consisting of “low fare or leisure passengers.”211 By contrast, Northwest’s 
broader definition of the market encompassed both low and high fare seg-
ments of the market by incorporating “all passengers on these routes.”212 
As of 1995, Northwest achieved status as the fourth-largest domestic air-
line.213 Northwest had a virtual monopoly over sixty-four of the eighty-six 
airport gates at the Detroit Metro airport and received business from 78 per-
cent of passengers flying through the airport.214 Utilizing the traditional hub-
and-spoke model, Northwest developed airport clubs, frequent flyer benefits, 
advanced seat selection, first class seating, and on-board meals in order to 
maximize revenue and to “try to sell every seat at its highest possible 
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fare.”215 Whereas Northwest secured consumer loyalty through name-brand 
appeal and a business model that relied upon “bells and whistles,” Spirit’s 
profitability depended solely upon the appeal of its competitively priced 
passenger fares.216 
At the time of suit, Northwest controlled 72 percent of the Detroit-
Philadelphia route and 89 percent of the Detroit-Boston route.217 North-
west sought to preserve its virtual monopoly of these routes by thwarting 
Spirit’s attempt to expand ticket counter and gate services at the Detroit 
Metropolitan Airport.218 Northwest entrenched itself by means of leases 
and secondary rights from other airlines.219 According to its own analysts, 
Northwest predicted that low-cost carriers would decrease its revenue by 
approximately $250–375 million per year.220 Northwest identified Spirit as 
such a low-fare carrier in one of its studies.221 
B. The Precarious Standard of Predatory Intent 
The Spirit court held that a jury may decide that “price-sensitive leisure 
passengers” constitute the relevant market segment for the purposes of the 
price-cost comparison, thereby preserving the possibility that Northwest 
illegally engaged in price predation.222 Further, the Spirit court incorrectly 
evaluated Northwest’s alleged predatory pricing on the basis of predatory 
intent, despite concluding that Northwest’s prices exceeded average variable 
costs on both routes.223 The court maintained that Spirit could nevertheless 
prevail under the test of “what a rational firm would have expected its prices 
to accomplish.”224 The danger of the subjective intent-based standard is that it 
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is symptomatic of an ailing system and evidences the need for reforms that limit unfair 
barriers to entry. See infra Part II.C. 
220 Spirit, 431 F.3d at 929. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 958. 
223 Id. at 938. 
224 Id. The Spirit court’s utilization of an intent based standard is in line with the Ninth 
Circuit’s standard, which likewise bases predation upon intent, even when prices exceed 
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provides no reliable means for distinguishing between illegal predatory 
behavior and legitimate competitive tactics.225 
Due to high barriers of entry to the airline industry, courts could interpret 
long-term gate leases as evidence of legacy carriers’ unlawful intent to secure 
the probability of a recoupment period following predatory pricing.226 
However, this subjective standard fails to consider a variety of objective vari-
ables that influence both the short-term strategy and long-term business 
models of hub-dominant airline carriers.227 For instance, regardless of high 
barriers to entry, air carriers may provide seemingly unprofitable fares due to 
anticipated decline in costs or the success of consumer loyalty programs. 
C. The Way Forward: A Case for Increased Regulation of the Airline Industry 
The current legal framework fails to protect competitors—and there-
fore consumers—from predatory pricing. However, the hesitancy of courts 
to condemn major carriers for the “discriminatory sharp-shooting” of new 
entrants may not stem from any shortcoming of the current legal standard.228 
Courts are likely justified in their deference to competition and weariness 
of condemning lawful, albeit aggressive tactics. 
This Note supports the seemingly ‘defendant friendly’ stance of the Dis-
trict Court in Spirit that the price-cost comparison test for price predation 
should derive the appropriate measure of cost from all passengers along the 
disputed routes.229 Considering only the limited leisure fair route for the pur-
poses of price comparison as part of the Brooke Group test improperly sim-
plifies the fluid and multifaceted relationship between passenger fare and 
strategies for deriving revenue.230 Even uniform adoption of the District 
Court’s assessment of the relevant market for purposes of the price-cost com-
parison test would fail to sufficiently police price predation. Due to the risk of 
injustice and harm to competitors that may result from the court’s inability to 
properly distinguish aggressive yet legitimate competitive behavior from 
predatory tactics, this Note suggests that the solution lies not in a retroactive 
                                                                                                                         
average variable cost. See William Inglis v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1034 
(9th Cir. 1981) (contending that the intent based test arguably favors plaintiffs). Cf. Morgan v. 
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225 See Robenalt, supra note 189, at 668. 
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judicial test, but rather in prophylactic measures through regulatory policy. 
One clear route to such a remedy would be to modify FAA regulations so 
that opportunities for price predation are thwarted from the onset. In particu-
lar, such regulations should focus on decreasing barriers to entry by ensuring 
fair access to routes and to gate and terminal leases. 
The Spirit court’s reliance on predatory intent and the price-cost com-
parison test is potentially harmful in its ineffectiveness to identify predatory 
pricing.231 Further, even if such case-by-case analysis properly sorted out 
predatory enterprises, any sanctions against defendants would still fail to 
remedy the fact that the new entrant ousted from the market permanently lost 
that particular opportunity to secure a share of the market.232 It is under-
standable that the Spirit court did not highlight market contestability in its 
discussion of Northwest’s alleged price predation. However, though ad-
mittedly an “unattainable ideal state[],” the theoretical notion of perfect 
market contestability nevertheless provides a helpful framework in price 
predation cases.233 
Enacting regulations that lower barriers to entry is a clear place to start 
in order to prevent predatory behavior. Experts acknowledge that “access to 
gates is critical” to the viability of new entrants.234 Particularly in regards to 
the airline industry, entry is not simply determined by developing the best 
business model, because denying entrants access to gates creates insur-
mountable barriers to entry.235 Providing new entrants with the reasonable 
expectation of securing gate leases would lower barriers to entry and main-
tain a competitive check on passenger fares offered by dominant airlines. 
Facilitating market entry would deter carriers from engaging in price pre-
dation by obviating the possibility of satisfying the second prong of the 
Brooke Group test.236 
The seemingly irrational practice of sub-competitive pricing is only pur-
sued when the possibility of recoupment exists.237 However, without the 
market dominance secured by high barriers to entry, passengers would not 
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pay for higher fares during the legacy carrier’s recoupment period due to the 
prevalence of more competitive options provided by low-cost carriers.238 
Therefore, prosecuting price predation should not hinge upon penalizing the 
alleged predator after the fact, but should instead rely upon preventative 
measures. Such strategy would further the intent of antitrust law by promot-
ing healthy competition. 
Relying upon the judicial system in order to deter price predation fails to 
stave off predatory behavior or to remedy high barriers to market entry. Even 
if courts were able to enact a test that properly identified price predation, 
successful plaintiffs would still remain in an unprofitable position.239 Even if 
such plaintiffs were afforded entry into the market, they would still have 
permanently lost the opportunity for profit that depended on the prior conver-
gence of favorable factors. Guaranteeing market entry following a suit would 
be an insufficient remedy, because the new entrant would likely not become 
profitable following the delay. Therefore, acknowledging the insufficiency 
of retroactive action, the solution lies in anticipating and regulating circum-
stances that create high barriers to market entry. 
The harm of gate monopolies and the likely effectiveness of prophylactic 
measures240 is clear from the facts in Spirit.241 Due to Northwest’s control 
of the Detroit gates, Spirit eventually spent more than $100,000 to obtain 
gate access and was forced to pay a 25 percent higher landing fee than legacy 
carriers, such as Northwest, which had secured long term leases with the 
Detroit Airport.242 
The ability of entrenched incumbents to establish high barriers to market 
entry unequivocally highlights the need to regulate opportunities for market 
entrants. While guaranteeing equal access to all competitors would unneces-
sarily strain already space-constrained airports and likely diminish the 
quality of passenger service, at least some reasonable opportunity to enter the 
market must be available to new enterprises. Once a new airline manages 
to secure access to a portion of the market, assuming the absence of other 
exclusionary forces, consumer choice should reward the most efficient and 
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appealing business model. Most critically, ensuring that incumbent airlines 
share the market with low-cost carriers would provide an essential competi-
tive check on passenger fares. Absent the presence of competition, ticket 
prices for any route would soar. 
Increased regulation as opposed to reliance upon judicial enforcement 
against predatory pricing is further supported by the inability of the price-
cost comparison test to definitively identify price predation. One problem 
is that the current standard for determining whether a defendant airline en-
gaged in price predation is high, reflecting reticence to sanction airlines for 
what may be legal competition.243 Departure from judicial tests in favor of 
preventative measures is also necessitated by the ambiguities upon which 
the judicial test is premised. One such unsettled component is a competitor’s 
ability to recoup. Courts look to the existence of high barriers to entry in 
order to determine whether the defendant airline could engage in a recoup-
ment period.244 A court is willing to find that defendant engaged in price 
predation when barriers to entry are “sufficiently high so that the predator 
can rely on a stable period of monopoly returns.”245 However, while high 
barriers to entry accurately indicate the possibility of successful recoup-
ment, they are not dispositive of a defendant’s predatory intent or actual 
predatory behavior.246 
The price structure and tactics of hub-dominant legacy carriers further 
expose the imprecision of the current judicial test. Legacy carriers have a 
“multi-layered fare structure” that is in itself not predatory, but may be ma-
nipulated for a predatory purpose.247 Incumbent airlines combine both low 
and high fares within a single flight, such that costs cannot be separated 
according to seat and compared with revenue for the purpose of the price-
cost comparison on a flight-by-flight basis.248 This makes it difficult to assess 
whether passengers on a particular route are paying fares that are above or 
below average variable cost. Further, it is difficult to determine whether a de-
fendant intentionally sustained a period of unprofitability for those routes.249 
Discontent with the current standard arises from the inability of the ju-
dicial test to “draw an adequate distinction between predation and vigorous 
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competition.”250 Due to this difficulty in separating low-fare from high-fare 
passenger routes, the Spirit court’s decision to isolate the low-fare leisure 
bracket therefore sets precedent that risks penalizing lawful competitors.251 
CONCLUSION 
The structure of the airline industry heightens antitrust concerns among 
its competitors. Incumbent legacy airlines have been able to use their clout 
to erect high barriers of entry for new entrant low-cost carriers. Further, the 
retaliatory response of legacy carriers to lower prices has been devastating 
for low-cost carriers, whose business model relies entirely upon attracting 
passengers with lower fare options. Such aggressive competitive maneu-
vering among legacy carriers has led to allegations of price predation. 
This Note contends that courts are justifiably hesitant to find that a de-
fendant airline engaged in price predation under section 2 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. Many aspects of the judicial test, particularly average variable 
cost, price-cost comparison, and identifying the relevant market provide im-
precise means of calculation for considering whether a defendant actually 
engaged in predatory pricing. Of great concern is the emphasis placed upon 
high barriers to entry in evaluating a defendant’s intent. While such barriers 
indicate the possibility that a defendant engaged in price predation, they do 
not contribute to the price-cost analysis or in any way confirm a defendant’s 
predatory purpose. 
Even though high barriers to market entry do not provide evidence of a 
defendant airline’s predatory intent, they nevertheless present an undue 
obstacle to competition. Instead of inhibiting competition by penalizing de-
fendants, prophylactic measures should be taken to obviate any possibility 
of price predation by eliminating such barriers in the first place. Regulating 
market entry so that legacy carriers do not monopolize airport slots and gates 
would benefit consumers by ensuring that competitively priced airlines pre-
vent legacy carriers from charging exorbitant passenger fares. 
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